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ADVOCACY AS MORAL DISCOURSE
THOMAS L. SHAFFERt
The freedom in which, in his distress, every man stands before God
must not be disturbed. If, therefore, he is persuaded to overthrow the
results of his reckoning without being first persuaded of the wrong-
ness of his manner of reckoning; if his earnest determination be de-
prived of its objects without first being provided with its proper
object; if he is made superficial and careless and muddleheaded
where he had previously been strict and precise; then he is simply
disturbed and led astray and hardened, and stumbling blocks and
occasions of falling are piled up in his path. What he needs, how-
ever, is to be persuaded to break through, with the same earnestness
and with the same determination to the place where-to the pure all
things are pure.1
Advocacy at its best is a form of reconciliation. It reconciles the
advocate with those whose champion he proposes to be. It reconciles
the advocate with his hearers. It reconciles the person whose cause is
advocated with the persons who hear advocacy. It brings to commu-
nity life a new sense of the interests of those the community neglects. It
seeks to make things better. It is moral discourse.
After King David took Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite,
and arranged the murder of Uriah, the Lord God sent his prophet Na-
than to the king. Nathan was sent to decry the injustice David had
done to Uriah. "The sword shall never depart from your house," Na-
than said to David. God, he said, would "raise up evil against you out
of your own house; and. . . take your wives before your eyes, and give
them to your neighbor. . . .Because by this deed you have utterly
scorned the Lord, the child that is born to you shall die."2 But before
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Nathan spoke in this judicial fashion, he engaged the conscience of
David. He told him a story:
There were two men in a certain city the one rich and the other poor.
The rich man had very many flocks and herds; but the poor man had
nothing but one little ewe lamb, which he had bought. And he
brought it up, and it grew up with him and with his children; it used
to eat of his morsel, and drink from his cup, and lie in his bosom, and
it was like a daughter to him.
Now there came a traveler to the rich man, and he was unwilling
to take one of his own flock or herd to prepare for the wayfarer who
had come to him, but he took the poor man's lamb and prepared it.
3
When King David heard Nathan's story, he was angered at the injus-
tice done by the rich man; David condemned the rich man, and then
Nathan said to King David,
You are the man .... [God] annointed you king over Israel, and
... delivered you out of the hand of Saul; and ... gave you your
master's house, and your master's wives into your bosom, and gave
you the house of Israel and of Judah; and if this were too little...
would add to you as much more. Why have you despised the word
of the Lord, to do what is evil in his sight?4
The result of Nathan's advocacy was that David condemned him-
self. He prayed for relief from the Lord's judgment, and when the
judgment came anyway, he acknowledged the justice of it. In the end,
David was reconciled, "and," the scriptures say, "the Lord loved him."
Bathsheba bore him a second son, Solomon, whose name means
peace.5
The greatest advocates of our century-people such as Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., or Mohandas Gandhi-have been Nathans. What made
these advocates unique was their concern with goodness. They insisted
on being concerned with the goodness even of the power brokers to
whom they appealed. They based their advocacy on the goodness in
those who were their clients. They appealed not to power but to con-
science.6 Their advocacy tended to reconcile people rather than defeat




6. My colleague, Professor Robert E. Rodes, Jr., raises a difficulty with this sentence: "Ad-
vocacy is addressed to people, not qualities, and if a person didn't have both of these [power and
conscience], advocacy addressed to him would be fruitless. If the person of power had no con-
science, you couldn't move him. If the person of conscience had not power, moving him wouldn't
further your cause." I think, first, that it is possible to move decisionmakers by appeals to author-
ity, to profit, and to values such as order, which are effective, or not, without regard to the con-
science of the decisionmaker. That is what I mean by appeals to power. The mark of appeals to
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This article will examine advocacy in two contexts. The first is
advocacy to an institution, conducted in the name of justice or the wel-
fare of the community; one might call this first category "public interest
advocacy." The second is advocacy as a lawyer more normally prac-
tices it, before judges and on behalf of a particular client. In both
cases, advocacy is different when pursued as moral discourse.
I. ADVOCACY TO AN INSTITUTION
A friend, an academic philosopher, related two experiences: First,
he was employed on a grant to set up and, as they say, coordinate a
series of community discussions of morals in banking, with particular
emphasis on the distribution of capital by banks so that the poor get a
share. Second, he spoke, by invitation, to a group of executives from a
manufacturing company on the subject of moral reasoning in business.
In the first case he noticed that the most coherent moral challenge to
the banks came from an articulate, young, legal-services lawyer. The
philosopher was impressed by the lawyer, but was dismayed to report
that the lawyer's challenge had been ineffective. The bankers who
heard the challenge were not influenced by it. In the second case, the
philosopher had a similar experience himself; his coherent presentation
of ethical insight was not heard.
The advocacy that failed here is common in America. It has oc-
curred recently in the massive civil rights movement after 1954, in
resistance to the Vietnam War, and in argument for better treatment of
the poor, the mentally retarded and disturbed, prisoners, the handi-
capped, women, and even animals, mountains, rivers, and trees. Sev-
eral preliminary observations about the nature of this advocacy are
important.
It is almost always moral advocacy. The claims it makes are moral
claims. If one were to state these claims in terms of principles, the prin-
ciples would be moral. So, for example, the advocate argues from fair-
ness, equality (an almost unquestioned moral value in America), the
plight of the disadvantaged (no man is an island), the welfare of future
generations, or that people are the stewards of nature. These claims are
often legal as well as moral, but their force in law is consequential to
their moral force; their legal character is consequent on the tendency of
conscience is that they seem interested-really interested-in the moral conversion of the deci-
sionmaker. King, Gandhi and Nathan sought to lead, or push, the decisionmaker to "the place
where-to the pure all things are pure." One result of living in that place is that one is reconciled
to those he has, or might have, wronged.
1979]
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public moral problems in America (slavery, abortion, racial discrimina-
tion, experimentation on live fetuses) to become legal problems.
I is notprophetic. Although this public interest advocacy proba-
bly cannot be said to be prophetic, it certainly seems prophetic: The
advocate is making a moral claim; he is calling upon bankers to think
of the poor, and upon business people to think of the employees and
customers in their enterprises as their most important asset. In both
cases, as is perhaps more typical of law-reform lawyers and philoso-
phers than of lawyers in private practice, the advocates have decided
not to use appeals to gain, even though other advocates of the same
objectives use appeals to gain. Thus, while one could argue that con-
cern for the poor is "good banking" in the profit-and-loss sense, or that
sound human-relations programs in business produce profits, it is more
characteristic of a prophet to disdain such argument and argue instead
in terms of duty or goodness. A final aspect in which these advocates
seem to be prophetic is that they do not mind being irritators. They
have decided to take the risk of irritation. A characteristic of the
prophet is that he puts himself at this risk.7
In all of these ways, the legal-services lawyer and the philosopher
seem to be prophetic, but in other ways they are not, as, in contrast,
Nathan, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr., were. They are not usu-
ally, for example, really atpersonal risk. Prophets (in the Old Testa-
ment mode anyway) are confrontive, uncivil, and direct. They seem
less to persuade than to invoke the wrath of God (or deliver it). Na-
than engaged the conscience of the king, a persuasive device, but he
also said boldly, "You are the man." Gandhi told the English judges
who sat on cases in which he was accused that they had only one
choice-to send him to jail, or to come down from the bench and join
him in his cause. King defied unjust law by breaking it and inviting
the consequences. He sought to illustrate injustice by forcing his perse-
cutors-the persecutors of his "clients," American black people-to
stand up for unjust law. In all of these ways prophets seem to be not
merely irritating but uncivil. Prophets also depend in some way on
transcendent verification.8 Nathan spoke for God; King called on God.
7. Vawter, Introduction to Prophetic Literature, in THE JEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY
227 (R. Brown, J. Fitzmyer & R. Murphy eds. 1968) ("[the fearless revelation of the moral will of
Yahweh"). "It would be impossible to find a non-Israelite court prophet who would speak to his
king as Nathan did to David. ... Id. at 229.
8. Another way to say this is that the words of the prophet are greater than the prophet, but
are still the words of the prophet himself. "The prophetic word lives a life of its own once it has
emanated from the prophet, and the prophet is very much identified with the word that he has
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Even democratic prophets-Gandhi is perhaps an example--call on
the transcendent truth that is seen to have been vested in a people.
Prophets speak in the name of this transcendence, more than in the
name of reason. (It seems that either sort of discourse can be moral,
that is, can be an appeal to conscience.) The legal-services lawyer and
the philosopher called on reason more than on transcendence, and in
this way, too, seem not to have been prophetic, even when they were
advocates to conscience, seeking to persuade by addressing conscience.
It is ineffective. The legal-services lawyer and the philosopher
were ineffective because they did not, as Nathan did, first engage con-
science. They seem not to have known how conscience is addressed
when decision-makers act in groups-as they usually do when the issue
is a public issue and the moral claims are made in the name of the
community. Effective advocacy of the sort being attempted seems to
require both a certain closeness to the decisionmaker (a shared vision
perhaps9) and a certain detachment.10




uttered.. .. [The prophet] was personally involved in the word . lived for it and was pre-
pared to die for it." Id. at 237.
9. Father Vawter noticed that the prophets (1) insisted on the connection between religion
and morality, although they were not usually religious leaders (ie., priests); (2) were connected
with power (in Israel with the monarchy); but (3) were not political: "They inculcated a known
morality or at least one that should have been known." Id. at 229-33. An advocate could argue to
conscience and still not be a prophet in the other senses noted here. The difference may be per-
sonal risk. I doubt that an advocate can be a prophet unless he puts himself at risk.
10. The "classical" Old Testament prophets were almost deviant in their ecstatic or charis-
matic character, and at some times even affected distinctive dress. The Hebrew word for prophet
means "one made to speak." The very fact of their speaking/or someone (the Latin root for the
word) also gives them detachment. In some cases Old Testament prophets were aliens-for exam-
ple, the prophet Balaam in Numbers 22-24. Vawter, supra note 7, at 223-29.
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The image represents a moral encounter that involves social justice.
The arrows suggest apparent communication from the advocate (the
square) to the decisionmakers (the circles) and back again, with the
public (cross marks) turning its attention one way and then the other,
as if watching a tennis game. This is the way a public moral debate
looks when one reads about it in the newspapers: The lawyer accuses
the banks of denying loans to the poor; the banks answer with eco-
nomic and social data, or with folk wisdom. The philosopher tells the
corporate managers about Aristotle and Aquinas and the moral shal-
lowness of utilitarian argument. And they, if they reply at all, tell him
about income statements and the barbarity of competition. Neither
side appears to convince the other; neither appears to bring the other to
pause or reflection. This is a debate; it does not look like moral dis-
course, because it does not seem possible that those who are accused
will stop and say, "Gee, maybe you're right." They are, in Barth's
phrase, being disturbed, led astray, and hardened.
It seems even less likely that the accuser will stop and say "Gee,
maybe Im mistaken." This is an important point. It seems necessary
to moral discourse that the advocate himself be willing to be per-
suaded. When Thomas Aquinas talks about "fraternal correction,""
or Karl Barth about "conditional advice," each of them emphasizes this
quality of openness in the advocate. Barth, for instance, says:
He who takes the risk of counseling must be prepared to be coun-
seled in turn by his brother if there is need of it. Such mutual coun-
seling in a concrete situation is an event. It is a part of the ethos
which is realized ethics .... The ethos of the ethicist implies that he
refrain from attempting too much and becoming thereby a
lawmaker. 12
This risk of being persuaded is corollary, perhaps, to the risk the
prophet takes when he speaks boldly and risks his life.
The uncolored figures (little uncolored circles in the big circle, and
the square on the right) are people who are or might join the advocate
in being irritators; they might even become prophets. 3 The difference
between those in the circle and the square is the difference between
being involved with power and being alienated from power. The
11. I ST. THOMAS AQuINAs, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1333-41 (Fathers of the English Domini-
can Province trans. 1947).
12. K. BARTH, THE HUMANITY OF GOD 86-87 (1960). Barth speaks ofdiscourse among theo-
logians as one in which the theologian "waits for them [other theologians] and asks them to wait
for him." Id. at 95.
13. The closeness of the prophet, note 9 supra, would be more likely for the circles than for
the advocate.
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square is alien here in two senses of the word. He is excluded by the
group, and he chooses to be excluded. He is perhaps a deviant, in Kai
Erikson's analysis of deviance-as Ann Hutchinson was in colonial
Massachusetts, to use one of Erikson's cases; 4 or as many of the early
Abolitionists were to the American commercial enterprise that nur-
tured slavery.' 5 The suggestion of deviance is useful here because there
seems to be a connection between being alienated from the deci-
sionmakers and being ineffective in making moral claims on the deci-
sionmakers. The square, which represents the legal-services lawyer in
the banking story and the philosopher in the corporation story, is an
irritator and a maker of moral claims, but he is ineffective-ineffective
but visible, visible and sad. He is ineffective because the circle is imper-
vious to his moral claim on it. He is sad in that preparation, good
intention, and even rightness ought to have influence on those who
wield power, but do not. Examples are sometimes tragic (Jesus before
the resurrection, Socrates) and sometimes pathetic (the character repre-
senting William Jennings Bryan in "Inherit the Wind"). The result is
personally sad, too, because the most admirable effort is often also the
most intense effort; effort approaches tragedy as it becomes intense and
nonetheless fails. Finally, he is visible, which is important because pri-
vate failure seems more like frustration than like tragedy. This ineffec-
tiveness is hard work, made visible, but come to naught.
The colored figures are the people who exercise power. They are
among the circle of those who decide, but they are more influenced
than influencing. In relatively organic groups (for example, some aca-
demic faculties), these are the elders. In boards of directors, they are
the insiders. In business there may be only one such person, but usu-
ally, even when the corporation appears to be an autocracy, decisions
are made in a group. In academic power groups, these exercisers of
power are a minority of those who hold authority collectively. In some
informal groups they are transient in membership but stable in their
loyalty to a coherent tradition. While this group may sometimes be
referred to as an "inner circle,"'16 the existence of a core of power in
such groups is more circumstantial than organizational: When it is a
group rather than an individual, it is not chosen by anyone, not even
itself; its authority is not usually planned. Its power is not formal, not
14. K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 71-107 (1966).
15. See generally S. MORIuSON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 518-24
(1965).
16. See generally G. DOMHOFF, THE BOHEMIAN GROVE AND OTHER RETREATS xli-xiv
(1974); G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES (1971); G. DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA (1967).
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negotiated. It does not show up on an organization chart. Such a
group is not nearly as active as naive people suppose it to be; it often
does not, for example, meet at all. It does not expressly decide, let
alone articulate its decision, even when everybody knows what it will
do. Its power, which is always real, is sensed by its own members most
of all, and sensed to a lesser extent by social scientists and investigative
reporters.
There is a distinction between the colored circles and the uncol-
ored ones, but a person who is one can become the other. Change from
one status to the other is probably the most common transience in
groups that exercise power and is at the heart of their closed politics.
7
What is distinctive about the uncolored circles is that they are eligible
to be irritators and are therefore potential prophets. In business, they
are the people who are chosen as targets by those who want to influ-
ence, change, or coerce corporate behavior. The Securities Exchange
Commission thus makes demands regarded as drastic on "outside" cor-
porate directors, or on independent auditors, or on lawyers retained to
advise corporations. Professional groups, and those who think of them-
selves as articulators of the public interest, make similar demands on
those members of the circle who think of themselves as professionals.
Lawyers and accountants are clear examples.' 8 There are transitions
toward professionalism by other members of the circle. An example is
the public-relations professional, who is more clearly dominated by
managers than lawyers and accountants are, but who is beginning to
insist upon an extra-corporate professional (and moral) identity. 9 In
my image, the uncolored circles might be an accountant and a lawyer,
and the half-colored circle a public-relations officer.
The uncolored circles are not only those on whom moral demands
from outside are made; they are also those who are, ex-officio, eligible
to make these moral demands on themselves, and, through themselves,
on the organization. They are potential moral irritators who can be
effective. They are more likely to be prophets than outsiders are.20
17. An example in fiction is C. SNOW, THE MASTERS (1960).
18. See, e.g., Crock, S.E. C to Consider Rule Requiring Lawyers to Disclose Fraud by Corpo-
rate Clients, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1978, at 5, coL 2.
19. See Montgomery, In Public Relations, Ethical Conflicts Pose Continuing Problems, Wall
St. J., Aug. 1, 1978, at I, col 1.
20. That is, they are more likely than outsiders to (1) speak from a shared morality; (2) use
arguments that are self-evidently valid; (3) identify personally with their moral claims (which
lawyers, as lawyers, rarely do); (4) be close to power but not political; (5) speak for someone
outside (or for God); and (6) by the very nature of things be at personal risk. See notes 8-10 supra.
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That is why the outside world-the SEC, bar associations and investi-
gative reporters-puts moral demands on them: Moral discourse is
more likely to take place within the circle than between the circle and
the square. Irritators from outside might better aim at initiating this
moral discourse, and nourishing it with thought and concern, than at
making moral demands on the organization as if the organization were
monolithic. The organization is not monolithic.21 It in fact contains
within itself the machinery for moral discourse and a way to conduct or
discourage moral challenges that it has not yet considered. Moral argu-
ments are heard there; more of them would be heard, and heard more
carefully, if those who make moral demands on organizations under-
stood the way moral discourse works in organizations. For examples:
The moral demand that women should have more status, pay, and
responsibility is, in the political society, an argument from distributive
justice. The moral discourse within the organization is more likely to
be in terms of injuries to particular people and in terms of resources
lost to the organization because of these injuries. At its most effective
this argument turns on making partners of people who are otherwise
dependents. The former demand, which is a demand from principle,
makes decisionmakers defensive. It pulls the colored circles and the
uncolored circles together in opposition to the demand. It tends to re-
solve itself, if at all, in coercion-usually in a lawsuit. The latter per-
sonal demand sounds and feels more like a wrong. If one thinks of
himself as an advocate for women who should be advanced, he will do
better to argue for them than for their cause. The uncolored circles
tend to understand this; the square appears not to understand. An ex-
perienced trial lawyer would understand this point better than the
young legal-services lawyer, or the philosopher, did.
The moral demand that corporate lawyers should call for indepen-
dence from the chief executive officers who are their employers is a
demand in principle.22 It turns on an idea about what corporate law-
yers are; it turns, that is, on a role model. Proponents of that view
might better ask what it is they want to accomplish (for example, more
honesty in disclosure statements) and let the lawyer decide where best
to initiate moral discourse. The lawyer, when he acts, might act more
as business colleague, coreligionist, or friend than as lawyer.
21. For example, appellate courts may act as if they were monolithic, but notice evidence to
the contrary, such as the common didactic advice to students in law school moot court programs
to put one point in the brief for each of the judges who will hear the case.
22. See Palmieri, Officers ofthe Board, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1978, at 12, col. 3.
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Moral claims about environmental pollution or exploitation of the
poor seem least effective when irritators argue about the welfare of so-
ciety and most effective when they make an argument, like the Prophet
Nathan's, that says to the decisionmaker, "What are you doing?" It
seems more effective to make the evil personal and personally discov-
ered than to appeal to a general sense of responsibility. An accusation
like Nathan's is less likely to be met with a utilitarian answer than is an
appeal to civic responsibility.3
All of this suggests that advocacy as moral discourse is not like
advocacy as an alternative to warfare. It is different, tactically and dy-
namically. One should conduct it differently. Advocacy as moral dis-
course is more private (even intimate), quiet, and personal. It turns less
on principles than on the story of the individual or the enterprise on
whom moral claims are made.24
II. LAWYERS' ADVOCACY: SUPERINTENDENT OF BELCHERTOW.N
STATE SCHOOL V SAIKEWICZ 2 5
When, in April 1976, Joseph Saikewicz was found to have termi-
nal leukemia, he was sixty-seven years old and had been for fifty-three
years a resident in Massachusetts state institutions for the mentally re-
tarded; he had an intelligence quotient of ten and a mental age of three
years. 26 The prognosis was that he would soon die, but that chemother-
apy might prolong his life by two months to a year. The chances of
even that limited success were less than half, but most people who are
able to make a choice for or against chemotherapy in this situation
23. Also, it seems important that Nathan had intimate access to the king; he was a member of
the king's circle. See note 9 supra. It is important to emphasize that the moral irritator and the
prophet are at risk. Professor Rodes suggested that my examples in text accompanying note 20
supra illustrate my claim better than other examples would. He mentioned Jesus' treatment of the
Pharisees, William Lloyd Garrison, the Vietnam War protestors, and those bearing witness
against the regime in Rhodesia. "There are," he said, "cases where you cannot be taken seriously
unless you show that your claim transcends civility." I agree; the open (uncolored) circles in my
image would be at greater personal risk in the cases Professor Rodes puts. They would also,
probably, be less civil.
24. Other examples would be less intimate and less quiet, such as Gandhi and King, or the
cases suggested in note 23 supra. Professor Stanley Hauerwas and I have urged that there is a
difference, relevant on this point, between what the advocate does and what the "powers of this
world," provoked to violence or fear, do in reaction to the advocate. Hanerwas & Shaffer, Hope
Meets Power. Thomas More and the King of England, 61 SOUNDINGS 456 (1978) (also to be pub-
lished as Hauerwas & Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, NOTRE DAM LAW.
(forthcoming)).
25. - Mass. -, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). For a contemporaneous discussion of the case, see
N.Y. Times, July 14, 1976, at 26, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1977, at A18, col. 6.
26. - Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
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choose chemotherapy.2 7
The treatment is unpleasant but does not produce side effects that
are unusual; Saikewicz had probably endured all of them. The usual
side effects were nausea, vomiting, bladder irritation, numbness, and a
tingling sensation in his hands and fingers.z8 Because the drugs are
administered intravenously, and because Saikewicz would remember
the side effects between treatments, the doctors expected resistance
from him and planned to strap him to a hospital bed. 9 A doctor who
knew him said, "When you approach him, he flails at you and there is
no way of communicating with him, and he is quite strong; so he will
have to be restrained and that increases the chance of pneumonia.""0
(Pneumonia was only a slight risk; the other risks were not unlike those
parents choose every day when they offer up their children for hospital
treatment.)
The alternative was, as the medical ethicists tend to put it, to "let
him die." The superintendent of the Belchertown State School, where
Saikewicz had lived since 1928, decided, probably from parental as
well as medical premises (he is a physician), to give Saikewicz chemo-
therapy. He also decided, probably after talking to the school's lawyer,
to seek a court order to that effect.
31
The probate judge appointed a lawyer to represent Saikewicz. The
lawyer at first assumed that this was a case for arguing "the right to
treatment," an idea new in the law, as health care for the retarded is
new in medicine. At this point, Saikewicz had the benefit of the aspira-
tions of both professions. His advocates sought for him both prolonged
life and the same care that moneyed, nonretarded people can obtain.
But Saikewicz's lawyer found that there were physicians in
Belchertown who were against treating Saikewicz. Under their influ-
ence, the lawyer abandoned the "right to treatment" argument (even
though the judge at first agreed with it) and argued instead that his
client should be allowed to die.32 This lawyer said that Saikewicz
would not be able to understand the discomfort and side effects of
27. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
28. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
29. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 421 n.5.
30. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1976, at 26, col. 2.
31. - Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
32. See id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 419. Although the case did not begin as a true adversary
proceeding, it took on that characteristic when Saikewicz's lawyer began arguing against the right
to treatment.
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chemotherapy. Saikewicz himself, to the slight extent he could be con-
sulted, would obviously resist treatment. This lawyer and the doctors
on his side tried to decide what Saikewicz would want, and then tried
to follow his "decision." That is also what the courts did. The probate
judge and the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
decided to let Saikewicz die without chemotherapy.33 The local judge
remarked that if he had been Saikewicz he would have preferred to die
without treatment.
The advocacy that was used began with a consideration of what
the client wanted-not what was best for him, but what he wanted.34
And it proceeded in a moral discourse, between lawyer and physicians,
that disregarded the professional ideals of prolonged life and the right
to treatment. The opposing argument, made by the attorney general of
Massachusetts, was that the interests of the state required chemother-
apy for Saikewicz.
Saikewicz died in September 1976. It is not possible to know if his
death was painless, but the physicians had predicted that it would be;
the probate judge had ordered, in innocent but ironic evidence of the
delusions of power, that Saikewicz be allowed to die "peacefully and
comfortably."35 The order of the Supreme Judicial Court had been
entered in July,36 but its opinion was delayed until the end of Novem-
ber, nearly three months after Saikewicz's death, so that the court could
receive briefs on the issues and prepare an opinion that spoke to the
difficult policy issues involved. Either because of the memory of what
they thought in July, or out of judicial habit, their opinion is an exam-
ple of moral discourse in appellate literature: The judges had become
advocates.
The court's opinion is a remarkable and largely positive example
of moral discourse. It is revealing in the way advocates and judges
attempted to understand Saikewicz, and in their assertion of the mini-
mum worth of a human being. It also reveals, curiously enough, a lot
about the results of lawyer-dependent moral decisions by showing how
our profession makes moral judgments for its clients when they are
able to speak for themselves, as Saikewicz was not.
The main argument these lawyers, doctors, and judges used was
Saikewicz himself; they refused to argue from an egalitarian category
33. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
34. Id. at-, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
35. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1977, at A18, col. 6.
36. - Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 419-20.
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(all people are alike), which here would have led to chemotherapy since
most people with Saikewicz's disease choose chemotherapy.3 7  The
court talked at some length about In re Quinlan,31 and found that case
less difficult because the New Jersey judges had had the benefit of the
testimony of Miss Quinlan's father, who spoke from "many years of
what was apparently a close and affectionate relationship with her."
39
The Saikewicz court struggled in an obviously sincere way to provide
for itself a substitute for Mr. Quinlan's testimony without surrendering
to "objective criteria." That meant that the court had to attempt to
explicate reasons, personal to Saikewicz, against choosing a longer life.
The court said that the value of life carried the same weight for
Saikewicz as for any other person, but Saikewicz was different in that
he would not understand the pain of treatment and could not therefore
choose to suffer.4" That bit of human nobility had been denied him.4 1
He could not cooperate with his doctors and therefore giving and re-
ceiving comfort was denied him. "He. . . would experience fear with-
out the understanding from which other patients draw strength. The
37. It has been frequently argued elsewhere that cases of "substituted judgment" for the men-
tally incompetent, and other treatment of such people in the judicial process, has to proceed in
terms of what "most people" would do. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
Elsewhere, the law seems unable to act when the person before it cannot behave as "most people"
behave. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); State v. Lang, 26 1t. App. 3d 648, 325
N.E.2d 305 (1975), discussed in Myers, The Strange Case of Daniel Lang, 64 A.B.A.J. 1198 (1978);
Annot., 38 A.L.R. Fed. 238 (1978).
38. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
39. - Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
40. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31.
41. Self-determination seems necessary before one can talk of suffering as constructive. L.
McCullough, Pain, Suffering, and Euthanasia (undated and unpublished) (Professor McCullough
is in the Department. of Philosophy at Texas A & M University).
[W]hat distinguishes suffering from pain is its personal quality. . . . [l]t may be that the
function of medicine is to relieve painful suffering which makes it impossible for us to
claim suffering as our own.. .. [W]e do not experience suffering until we know how to
name it and we must be taught how to do that. . . . For suffering to be recognized, i.e.
named, involves an interpretive context, then the very interpretation seems to carry a
"point." The interpretation at least places the suffering in a narrative context ....
S. Hauerwas, Reflections on Suffering, Death, and Medicine (undated and unpublished) (Profes-
sor Hauerwas is in the Department of Theology at the University of Notre Dame). Karl Barth
gives Christian expression to this idea:
In the Spirit, we are enabled to know the meaning of our life, as it is manifested in
suffering. In the Spirit, suffering, endured and apprehended, can become our advance to
the glory of God. This revelation of the secret, this apprehension of God in suffering, is
God's action in us.
K. BARTH, supra note 1, at 301. Apprehension of God in suffering was apparently not available to
Saikewicz, although a Christian must suppose that other means to apprehension of God were
available to him, as the text on which Barth commented would imply: "[Mie suffer with him, that
we may be also glorified together." Romans 8:17. The Massachusetts court's sense of wonder
about Saikewicz's hidden personality.is born of reflection on his suffering. Christian theology
retains a similar sense of wonder about the hidden personality of Jesus.
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inability to anticipate and prepare. . . leaves room only for confusion
and disorientation.
4 2
The probate judge had premised his decision in part on "the quali-
ty of life possible for [Saikewicz] even if the treatment does bring about
remission." The Supreme Judicial Court refused that reason "to the
extent that this formulation equates the value of life with any measure
of the quality of life," but it suggested that the judge may only have
intended to take "special care. . . to respect the dignity and worth of
Saikewicz's life precisely because of his vulnerable position."43 People
might very well be equal before the law, but they are never equal
before one another, and the law had best take account of the fact that
some of us are aggressive and many are victims. When advocacy ar-
gues from the person of its client, rather than from his interests or his
cause, it can take account of his vulnerability.44
The paternalistic arguments were arguments from professional-
ism-that is, prolongation of life and right to treatment. In many ways,
the task of Saikewicz's lawyer was to defeat professionalism. In this
case, professionalism, in serving power, argued from the interests of the
state-notably for the preservation of (right to) life, and the ethical in-
tegrity of the medical profession. These arguments are of two rather
different kinds. One was from equalitarian premises (apparently for
Saikewicz's benefit but without regard for who he was); the other as-
serted the interests of third persons (Saikewicz should be kept alive in
order that the interests of the medical profession would be served). The
court decided, first, that the state cannot require a person to bear "the
traumatic cost of [the] prolongation" of life unless he chooses to do so.
"The value of life. . . is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment,
but by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of
choice."4 Second, the court noted that the prevailing ethical practice
seems to recognize that the dying are more in need of comfort than
treatment. It was not "necessary to deny a right of self-determination
to a patient in order to recognize the interests of doctors." If it ever
42. - Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
43. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
44. My favorite example before the Saikewicz case was Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199
(1960).
45. - Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26. The court extended to the incompetent whatever
rights the competent have: "We recognize a general right in all persons to refuse medical treat-
ment in appropriate circumstances. The recognition of that right must extend to the case of an
incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to both."
Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
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becomes necessary, the law will come down on the side of patients.46
The Saikewicz case is an example of the reconciliation of the per-
son whose cause is advocated with those who listen to advocacy. Rec-
onciliation in this case was both easier and harder than it is in more
usual cases: easier because the court's view of the "substituted judg-
ment" doctrine required it to look as deeply as it could at the personal-
ity before it; and harder because this sort of care tempts judges to take
the comfort of egalitarian solutions-to take a poll, 4 7 decide from con-
ventional premises,48 or let themselves be governed by professional-
ism.4 9 The remarkable nature of the case is garnished by three facts
that suggest how vulnerable conscience is in moral discourse: (1)
Saikewicz's lawyer first argued for the right to treatment, then, upon
reflection and after moral discourse with doctors, changed his mind
and argued against the right to treatment. (2) The probate judge first
decided to order treatment, then changed his mind. (3) The original
order in the Supreme Judicial Court noted dissenting votes, but the
final opinion as published is unanimous.
III. CONCLUSION: MORAL DISCOURSE AND THE COMMUNITY
Advocacy as moral discourse reconciles advocate to client, advo-
cate to those who listen to advocacy, and those who hear advocacy to
the client. It does this through exalting care over professionalism,
through arguing to the consciences of those it addresses, and through
arguing from the persons of those it advocates.5 0 Advocacy radiates
46. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 427. This reasoning was not applied by the Supreme Court of the
United States to unborn children in the abortion cases because the Court did not extend the defi-
nition of "person" to the unborn child. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
The criticism that the Saikewicz decision arrogates power to judges, and takes it away from
doctors, seems to me to miss the point that the Massachusetts court made-that patients should
not be forced to suffer for the dignity of the medical profession. The point is the preservation of
moral discourse in these "bioethical" cases. The Massachusetts court did that in Saikewicr, the
Supreme Court of the United States refused to do it in Roe v. Wade. In both cases it was apparent
that the medical profession had not preserved moral discourse. The court in Saikewicz took noth-
ing away; it filled a vacuum. See Macntyre, Patients as Agents, in 3 PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL
ETHICS: ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 197 (S. Spicker & H. Englehardt eds. 1977).
47. See O'Meara, Natural Law and Everyday Law, 5 NAT. L.F. 83 (1960); Note, Naturaliza-
tion-Good Moral Character as a Prerequisite, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 375, 380 (1959). Both argue
against measurement of public opinion as a solution to moral problems in the law; both essays
refer to the "good moral character" cases in immigration law.
48. See, e.g., Strnnk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
49. The recent judicial immunity case is an example. See Stump v. Sparkman, 433 U.S. 349
(1978).
50. It perhaps, finally, serves the way people are. We seem to yearn for relationships, to
overcome the alienation that professionalism only aggravates. See Kaplan, Martin Buber andthe
Drama of Otherness: The Dynamics of Love, Art, and Faith, 27 JUDAISM 196 (1978).
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into the community, into consideration of social justice, because of four
features that distinguish moral discourse from adversary discourse: (1)
Moral discourse is interpersonal; (2) Moral discourse argues from the
person of the client; (3) Moral discourse is addressed to the conscience
of those who hear it; (4) Moral discourse, because it is a form of recon-
ciliation, binds the community together.
Interpersonal. The Saikewicz case was unusual in method as well
as in substance. It was different in medicine because many of the doc-
tors involved argued against medical treatment. It was different for law
because ordinary legal methodologies did not suit the case. The court
pointed beyond ideas of health, or ideas of right, to Joseph Saikewicz
himself. The judges decided he would be better off if our professions
left him alone. What that poor man needed, as he ended more than
half a century in a school for the retarded, was a friend as he died. The
court could not explain his needs in terms either of health or of rights.
It had to explain them in reference to Saikewicz himself.
Advocacy as moral discourse begins in the person of the client.
The advocate has to cultivate an examination of conscience in which he
asks himself where his advocacy does not begin. In the spirit of those
little prayerbook questions we Catholics used to read before we went to
confession, the first question is whether I have violated professional
consensus. If what I am doing would be generally approved by my
professional colleagues, it may be wrong-it may be more professional
than personal. We lawyers have had some of our best moments when
we were made uncomfortable by renegades such as William Kunstler
and Michael Tigar. Maybe doctors have their best when they are chal-
lenged by renegades such as Thomas Szasz and the physicians at
Belchertown who thought that the frail dignity of Joseph Saikewicz was
more important than medical expertise. Advocacy as moral discourse
seems to require humility, and the least likely humility is humility in a
professional group.'
51. This is not to suggest that violation of professional consensus is some sort of test of the
quality of moral discourse, but it is an important question, because people as part of professional
groups seem more vulnerable to self-deception than people taken one at a time. The object, as
Barth put it:
We stand in need, not of patience, but of the impatience of the prophets, not of well-
mannered pleasantry, but of a grim assault, not of the historian's balanced judgement
.. . but of a love of truth which hacks its way through the very backbone of the matter,
and then dares to bring an accusation of unrighteousness against every upright man.
K. BARTH, supra note 1, at 395; see Hauerwas & Burrell, Sef-Deception andAuobiography:. Re-
flections on Speer's Inside the Third Reich, J. RELIGIouS ETHICS, May 1974, at 2, reprinted in S.
HAuERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY 82 (1977).
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Another test is whether we annoy our governors. When the com-
munity says that we are overstepping our bounds-that it is not a doc-
tor's job to advocate, nor a lawyer's job to talk about what should be
done for the sick-we are probably doing something right. We profes-
sionals have franchise and power, but we pay a price for it. The price is
that we are expected to subordinate our personal sense of good to our
expertise. The world needs to keep its experts in their place. Experts,
as someone said, are supposed to be kept on tap, not on top. When we
are on tap we are easy to predict. We annoy the world when we be-
come unpredictable.
The person whose cause is advocated. Advocates of this sort find
their mission in the unique personality of the client, and then hold that
unique personality up as their strongest argument for change. They
advocate a person more than a cause. Professionalism gets in the way
here, too. It shows up in the legal profession in the nearly universal
tendency to let adversary ethics, rather than the persons of clients, con-
trol advocacy. We lawyers use the adversary system to avoid moral
discourse. We use it to hide all our great moral questions-the prob-
lem of the guilty client, the problem of assisting evil people to advance
evil designs, and the ultimate problem of whether lawyers are of value
either to their clients or to the community.5 3 We are rarely caught in
our evasion because we are attracted to it as a competitive game and we
become good at the game. We come to think that it has validity. Ste-
phen Wexler, a poverty lawyer, gives this example from a courtroom
exchange several years ago:
[The case involved] a soldier who wanted to get out of the Army
for religious reasons. His petition for habeas corpus was denied, and
his attorney asked the court to prohibit the Army from transferring
him to Vietnam pending the filing of an appeal. The Assistant
United States Attorney on the case looked, for all the world, like an
ordinary human being; yet, when the soldier's attorney asked for the
stay of transfer orders. . . ,the Assistant United States Attorney said
"I'm afraid we'd have to oppose that."
No one even checked with the Army to see if it would cause a
52. E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED (1963), has this bias. I argue, in Hauerwas &
Shaffer, supra note 24, and in Shaffer, Justice in Everyday Life, 22 RES GESTAE 394 (1978), that
adversary ethics is the ethics of fear.
53. Shaffer, Guilty Clients and Lunch with Tax Collectors, 37 JURIST 89 (1977), is a clumsy
beginning for discussion, and one I hope to rethink, on the guilty client problem and, through that
problem, on the value of lawyers to clients. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975), is a persuasive analysis of the ethics of role in the legal profes-
sion. See also Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 721
(1975).
1979]
NORTH CAROLINA LW REVIEW [
problem. The delay was opposed because within the lawyer's game it
could be opposed. One little piece on the board was the U.S. Army,
the other was the soldier; and the soldier's lawyer had just drawn a
card which said: "ON HIS NEXT TURN THE OTHER PLAYER
MAY MOVE YOUR PIECE TO VIETNAM."
54
One reason this sort of thing happens in the legal profession is the
phenomenon of imputed competence. A client is not really allowed to
think about the competence of his lawyer. He is to assume it. The
professional is the one who knows how to move the pieces. This idea
persists despite persuasive evidence that it is morally and fiscally
untrue.
Our profession sometimes grows ashamed of its -arrogance, but
when it does it tends to turn clients into bureaucrats, as members of
committees, instead of going back and looking at them as the reasons
for the enterprise. In the legal world Mr. Wexler wrote about-poverty
law-the profession decided that the solution to professional arrogance
was to require the participation of the poor-not in the cases, but in the
supervision of law offices. The clients were to become powers in the
bureaucracy. Art Buchwald reports an interview he was inspired to
give after the government and the legal profession made this decision.
He finally located a man who would admit he was poor:
I asked him if he thought he would like to serve on a committee
to see what could be done about poverty.
"Mister, if I had any ideas what to do about poverty, I wouldn't
be poor."
"But there is a school of thought in Washington that poor peo-
ple are the only ones who know the real problems of the poor, and
they should be strongly involved in the program to formulate and
implement antipoverty programs."
"I wouldn't serve on a board unless they paid me," he said.
"Oh, I'm sure they would pay you. If they agreed to pay you,
what is the first thing you would do?"
"I'd move out of the neighborhood."
"But if you did that, you would lose contact with poor people
and you would no longer be able to speak for them."
"Exactly. Poor people don't want to be spoken for. They just
want to get the hell out of the neighborhood."
54. Wexler, Practicing Lawfor Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1060 (1970).
55. See generally D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974). An
interesting insight into this view of lawyers-and an interesting challenge to it-is a prescriptive
list from the National Organization of Women for women seeking divorce lawyers. T. SHAFFER,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 142-43 (1976).
56. Buchwald, .4 Pennyfor His Thoughts, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1976, § V, at 2, col. 2.
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Participation by the poor does not work. The reason it does not is that
poverty in America is a moral question, as well as a political question.
The advocacy that poor people need includes advocacy that requires
the rest of us to look at poor persons, and to think about each of them,
and to feel ashamed of ourselves for allowing such misery in the midst
of plenty. Mr. Buchwald's point was that it will not do to tell the poor
to take our money and go do something about themselves. What we
should have learned was something about ourselves: We don't want to
help the poor unless they fit our definitions."
The conscience of the hearer. The greatest example in Christian
literature of advocacy to conscience is the story of Jesus and the woman
taken in adultery: Some law professors brought the woman to Jesus,
hoping to confound him and establish his disregard for the law. In the
process they proposed to give the woman her just deserts. "'Teacher,'
they said to Jesus, 'this woman was caught in the very act of commit-
ting adultery. In our Law Moses gave a commandment that such a
woman must be stoned to death. Now, what do you say?"' St. John
reports that-Jesus wrote on the ground with his finger for a while, and
then said, "Whichever one of you has committed no sin may throw the
first stone at her." He returned to his writing and the law professors
left. The woman stayed behind and held moral discourse with the
Founder of Christianity.5"
The story illustrates how group consensus is an obstacle both to
advocacy and to justice. There was no doubt about the rightness of a
rule against adultery; Jesus, who was himself a teacher of Mosaic law,
did not argue about that. He did not even argue about the sanction.
But the rule and the sanction had hidden the reason for the enterprise,
which was the goodness of people like that woman. Sometimes one has
to bear witness against the rules in order to give purpose to the rules.
Dr. Larry Churchill, a medical ethicist, argues this way with refer-
ence to ethical rules in the medical profession: Professional ethics be-
come accountable when they include within them "the capacity for
self-restriction and self-criticism" on grounds other than those which
currently undergird the profession.59 "The absence of such a self-criti-
cal principle makes all questions raised by the public seem to be an
57. Moral advocacy for the poor has political implications, no doubt; what interests me at the
moment is that political advocacy for the poor seems most feckless when it is not grounded in
moral discourse.
58. John 8:3-11 (American Bible Society).
59. Churchill, The Professionalization of Ethics: Some Implications for Accountabili y in
Medicine, 60 SOUNDiNos 40, 44-45 (1977).
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attack and makes the healer's mantle an aegis from the variety of val-
ues held by his patients. It makes the physician an adversary of his
patient instead of an advocate."6 ° Dr. Churchill argues that doctors
should develop a morality of self-accepted moral principles and move
beyond a morality of conventional role conformity.6' "The transition
.. . is blocked when there is confusion between group loyalty and the
validity of the moral principles the group holds."62 The same argu-
ment applies concerning the adversary ethic in the law. The idea, as
Churchill puts it, is "awareness of oneself as an autonomous agent, able
to judge the morals of his group for himself. '6 3 Theories of health and
theories of human rights would be enriched by that sort of moral enter-
prise. The enterprise becomes advocacy when we translate it into dis-
course outside the professional group. When advocacy begins, we will
discover that we have become committed to something greater than our
professions.
This process of seeking the conscience of the hearer involves a suc-
cession of steps. In the first step, the advocate points to rights, to prin-
ciples that promise a benefit for his client. In the second step, he takes
his client by the hand and makes personal claims on the decisionmaker,
claims of conscience that do not rest on professionalism, but rest on the
fact that we people are all in this thing together.' And then the dia-
logue, the discourse, becomes one in which people encounter people,
and negotiate on the basis of what they need from one another and
what they owe to one another.
65
60. Id. at 45.
61. Id. at 50.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The idea is so ordinary that it takes professionalism to obscure it. Galsworthy makes fun
of the obscuring of interpersonal claims when he has Soames Forsyte say to his daughter Fleur,
who is the defendant in a jury-tried libel case, "'The great thing is to keep still, and pay no
attention to anything. They'll all be behind you, except the jury-and there's nothing in them
really. If you look at them, don't smile!"' J. GALSWORTHY, THE SILVER SPOON 235 (1976).
65. This idea of law is developed in R. RODEs, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE (1976), and is sug-
gested a bit in L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw (1964); Professor Fuller seemed, though, un-able to get beyond applications to procedure. In The Republic, Plato had Thrasymachus assert
that justice is the interest of the stronger. "[lun all states there is the same principle of justice,
which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power,
the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the
interest of the stronger." I THE Dir oGus OF PLATO 603 (B. Jowett trans. 1892). Socrates in-
sisted that the way to talk about justice is without reference to power. He insisted that this form of
discourse will unite content (the issue of what justice is) and process (the concern of the discussers
for one another): "[I]f we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one
another, we shall unite the officer ofjudge and advocate in our own persons." Id. at 613; see notes
I 1 & 12 and accompanying text supra.
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Moral discourse reconciles: it binds together the hearer, the advo-
cated and the advocate. Three of the four heroes recommended here
(Gandhi, King, and Nathan) were not lawyers, and the behavior of the
fourth (Saikewicz's lawyer) was not traditional lawyer behavior. These
facts suggest that there is a difference between advocacy as moral dis-
course and adversary discourse as it is traditionally described by the
legal profession and as it is distilled into principles, aspirations, and
inspiration in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.66 It seems that there are differences, but that moral dis-
course and adversary discourse are not in all respects opposites. The
differences are more tendencies than categories. For examples:
(1) Adversary discourse seems to involve ideals of dignity, im-
age, influence, and survival in the professional group, the legal profes-
sion." Moral discourse tends more to the development of a
compassionate community. It tends to look beyond the group, and
even beyond the state.68 Both forms of discourse are advocacy; that is,
each is addressed to decisionmakers and wielders of power. King, Na-
than, and Gandhi addressed power as much as modem American law-
yers do; Saikewicz's lawyer addressed power both as lawyers do and as
King, Nathan, and Gandhi did. The difference seems to inhere in
images-the roles, if you like-that members of professional groups
have.
(2) Adversary discourse emphasizes uprightness, respectability,
and moral independence in individual practitioners;6 9 moral discourse
emphasizes the moral claims of clients, and, more than is true in adver-
sary discourse, identifies with the moral claims of clients. Moral dis-
course makes this identification with clients advertently, but it does not
necessarily lose its identification with power groups as it does so:
Saikewicz's lawyer did not surrender his status at the Bar; King steadily
gained influence among powerful groups in America; Nathan, as
prophet, both confronted the king and was a member of the king's
66. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement: "The Code is
designed to be adopted by appropriate agencies.. . as an inspirational guide to the members of
the profession. .....
67. See note 69 infra.
68. The distinction between community (he says "nation") and state is elaborated in J. MARI-
TAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 1-27 (1951).
69. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1 ("A Lawyer Should Assist In
Maintaining The Integrity And Competence Of The Legal Profession"). This is related to the
individual practitioner in EC 1-5: "A lawyer should maintain high standards of professional con-
duct ... be temperate and dignified,... refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible con-
duct." EC 3-1 and 3-2 and Canon 6 apply these ideals more specifically, in terms of competence
and responsibility.
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court.7 °
(3) Adversary discourse seems to concentrate on loyalty to the
client as its governing ethical principle; it exalts loyalty as a virtue.7
1
Moral discourse is based less on loyalty to the client than on the good-
ness of the client.72 King's leading the civil rights movement in prayer
for its oppressors is an example of that-if one believes, as Dr. King
did, that a believer seeks to rise to the aspirations of his prayers.
(4) Adversary discourse, in the Code's explication of loyalty as a
virtue, comes to define its goal in terms of service to the government.
73
The reason for loyalty, as the Code explains it, is that loyalty will lead
to more acceptable service to the judicial system (that is, to the govern-
ment). Moral advocacy explains itself more in terms of service to the
person; it radiates into the community because it is interpersonal, be-
cause it argues from the person of the client, because it is addressed to
conscience, and because it seeks reconciliation rather than victory.7 4 Its
heroes are heroes of reconciliation, and that means that moral dis-
course does not serve power; it does not seek to justify itself in terms of
power. This is a significant difference:
Justice is not the result of power. It is not the result of force.
The idea that governments provide goodness-that power provides
justice-is where tyranny begins.
We lawyers should be sober and watchful about the horrors of
what people have done to one another in the name of the law. These
horrors occur when people begin to believe that good can be
achieved with power. The holocaust is one example. The crucifixion
is another.
70. Charles Morgan is another, almost prophetic, example. See Powledge, Somethingfor a
Lawyer to Do, NEw YORKER, Oct. 25, 1969, at 63.
71. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise
Independent Professional Judgment On Behalf Of A Client"); EC 5-I ("Neither his personal in-
terests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute
his loyalty to his client"); canon 4 (confidentiality); and canon 7 (zealous representation).
72. See Shaffer, supra note 52.
73. Canon 2 ("A Lawyer Should Assist The Legal Profession In Fulfilling Its Duty To Make
Legal Counsel Available"); EC 7-18 (lawyers should not communicate directly with clients of
other lawyers because "the legal system ... functions best when persons in need of legal advice
or assistance are represented by their own counsel"); EC 8-1 (lawyers should propose and support
legislation to improve the legal system).
74. Tillich has said:
[T]he ambiguities of competition... work continuously for inequality in the encounters
of people in daily life, in the stratification of society, and in the political self-creation of
life. The very attempt to apply the principle of equality, as contained unambiguously in
the acknowledgement of the person as person, can have destructive consequences for the
realization of justice.
3 P. TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 80-81 (1963).
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The S.S. officer in "The Holocaust" did not set out to do evil.
He did evil because he set out to do good with force and came to
believe that force was the way to goodness. . . . It is probably a
good thing for a nation to be saved, but it is corrupt and fatal to
suppose that power can save a nation.75
The Code tends to celebrate advocacy in the service of power. This is,
to be sure, only a tendency. The Code is not palpably hostile to the sort
of advocacy discussed in this article, but it neglects it. The tendency
and the neglect might be illustrated with two texts from the Code. One,
under canon 7 ("A Lawyer Should Represent A Client Zealously
Within The Bounds Of The Law"), deals with the situation in which
Joseph Saikewicz's lawyer found himself:
If the client is capable of understanding the matter in question or of
contributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of
whether he is legally disqualified from performing certain acts, the
lawyer should obtain from him all possible aid. If the disability of a
client and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer to
make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all circum-
stances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance
the interests of his client.
76
That aspiration, by turning more on the interests of the client than on
the person of the client, tends toward argument for the right to treat-
ment and against arguments that are based on a compassionate view of
the client's situation. In Saikewicz, it was the proponents of chemo-
therapy who argued from Saikewicz's interests; the lawyer who argued
for Saikewicz himself, and, ultimately, the judges in the case, grounded
their decisions in something more human than interests.
A broader example is the final, summary ethical aspiration in the
Code, under canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even The Appearance
Of Professional Impropriety"). It illustrates that the Code's governing
moral principles are loyalty to clients and service to power:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor
of his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the courts
and judges thereof; to observe the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity; to act as a member of a learned profession, one dedicated to pub-
lic service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers in supporting the
organized bar through the devoting of his time, efforts, and financial
support as his professional standing and ability reasonably permit; to
conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to
inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the pub-
lic; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also
75. Shaffer, supra note 52, at 397.
76. EC 7-12.
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the appearance of impropriety.77
By contrast, the examples used here as ideals share a tendency to recon-
ciliation and disdain a tendency to support for power, professional
honor,78 and protected membership in a protected group. Martin Lu-
ther King's earliest public advocacy, in the bus boycott in Birmingham,
started with his knowing the black people in the back of the bus. It
proceeded with his holding up those people until the white citizens
were ashamed of themselves. 79 It ended with people being brought
back together-the advocates, the advocated, and the decisionmakers.
That was Dr. King's usual procedure. In the heat and turmoil and cru-
elty of Selma, King gathered his followers together and prayed for the
police. He talked to his followers about redemptive love-for the
police."0 His was like the procedure Gandhi used when he told the
English judges that they had a choice-to uphold unjust laws and send
Gandhi and his followers to prison, or to come down from their
benches and join Gandhi in his witness against injustice. That is moral
discourse-an interpersonal thing-a thing grounded in the person of
the client, a plea to conscience, and a form of reconciliation.
77. EC 9-6. The reference to "brother lawyers" will strike many as uncommonly insensitive
in a document drafted 10 years ago. That insensitivity and the Code's repeated celebration of the
dignity of the profession are, I think, related.
78. See Lewis, Christianity and Culture, in CHRISTIAN REFLECTIONS 12 (W. Hooper ed.
1967).
79. Of course, the bus company lost money, but that was not the essence of the matter, even
from a power-politics point of view.
80. One is tempted, in such a dramatic case, to see an opposition between love and justice;
the opposition is useful in thinking about Dr. King's social witness. Dr. King might have admit-
ted, though, that in the final analysis he sought a just order between the police and the people of
Alabama:
[T]he basic ontological order is love, then justice; but in terms of the gradual achieve-
ment of order, the order may be [but was not in Selma] justice, then love.
...That love is indeed great--that considers whatever is here and now obstructive
to one's neighbor and the community as no longer a right at all, demonstrative legal title
and honest acquisition to the contrary notwithstanding. For love there is a clear distinc-
tion between abstract right and the actual need for that right.
...Before God, the duties of love are no less binding than the duties of jus-
tice. . . . IT]he duties of love are measured by the progress of the person in good.
Haring, Justice, in 8 NEw CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 68, 69-70 (1967).
Vol. 57
